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The Wiretapping-
Eavesdropping Problem:
A Defense Counsel's View
Edward Bennett Williams*
I. Tn- WIRETAPPING PROBLEM
The truth is that wiretapping today is a plague on the nation. It is a far
more serious intrusion on privacy than the general writs of assistance used
in colonial days. Now all the intimacies of one's private life can be recorded.
This is far worse than ransacking one's desk and closets. This is a practice
that strikes as deep as an invasion of the confessional.1
Unfortunately, these biting words of Mr. Justice Douglas do not
describe a new practice. Wiretapping is as old as the telephone it-
self; yet, as Samuel Dash, Robert Knowlton, and Richard Schwartz
have demonstrated in The Eavesdroppers,2 the problems posed by
wiretapping remain as far from solution as ever.
Attorney General Rogers published an article in 1954 which sum-
marized the case for wiretapping He urged that wiretapping is
essential to protect the nation against spies, saboteurs, and other
subversives. He further urged that it is no worse than the use of
informants, decoys, dictaphones, peeping, and the like, all of which
have been accepted practices of law enforcement for many years.
Neither of these arguments, however, is really dispositive of the
issue. Informed sources have questioned the real utility of wiretaps
in security cases. In the celebrated case of United States v. Coplon,4
for example, the prosecution succeeded in convincing the trial
court that none of its evidence came from wiretapping, despite
almost continuous interception of the defendant's telephone calls."
In other words, the government itself took the curious position that
wiretapping had been completely useless.
Professor Louis B. Schwartz, who, during the four years he spent
in the Department of Justice, helped prosecute the leading federal
* Member of the District of Columbia Bar.
1. DOUGLAS, TnE RIGiT O THE PEOPLE 151 (1958).
2. DASH, KNOWLTON & SCHwARTZ, THE EAVESDROPPEBS (1959) [hereinafter cited
as DAsH).
3. Rogers, The Case for Wire Tapping, 63 YALE L.J. 792 (1954).
4. 88 F. Supp. 921 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
5. See id. at 926, reo'd on other grounds, 185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950).
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wiretapping cases, has made a fine analysis of this problem.6 He
concluded:
[lt is clear that there never was a showing or even a serious attempt to
show that we would catch fewer criminals or that criminal activity would
increase in case of the unavailability of the surveillance devices involved.
All we could prove, and I think all that the current talk of necessity means
is that the prosecution will lose a particular conviction, as in the Coplon
case, when it becomes known that an illegitimate detection device has been
employed. This does not prove that future Coplon cases cannot be found
and successfully prosecuted by more orthodox procedures. Nor is it rea-
sonable to suppose that the failure of the Coplon prosecution has encour-
aged or increased espionage activity. A traitor who risks death if
apprehended is certainly not going to be deterred by the knowledge that
his telephone may be tapped; at most, he will avoid use of the telephone.
7
Interestingly enough, these views were once shared by J. Edgar
Hoover. In 1940 Hoover termed wiretapping an archaic and ineffi-
cient" practice which "has proved a definite handicap or barrier in
the development of ethical, scientific, and sound investigative tech-
nique." And again in 1941, he approved a press release stating that
"the discredit and suspicion of the law enforcing branch which
arises from the occasional use of wiretapping more than offsets the
good which is likely to come of it." 9
Perhaps it may be easier to catch spies by wiretapping than by
other methods. I suppose law enforcement would also be easier if we
could use torture, general search warrants, mass arrests, and indefi-
nite police detention. It would likewise be easier to convict spies if
we could suspend the fifth and sixth amendments in such cases, so
that there would be no privilege against self-incrimination and no
right to counsel. The difficulty is that we destroy exactly what we
are seeking to preserve when we try to protect democracy with
essentially totalitarian tools.
There is grave reason to fear, moreover, that a law allowing wire-
tapping in security cases would provide an opening wedge for per-
mitting wiretapping in all cases. During the eighty-second Congress,
a bill was introduced to permit wiretappig in cases involving the
national security.10 During the eighty-fifth Congress, the sponsor of
this legislation introduced a bill to permit wiretapping in all felony
cases.". During the eighty-sixth Congress, this same member intro-
6. Schwartz, On Current Proposals to Legalize Wire Tapping, 103 U. Pa. L.
RFnv. 157 (1954).
7. Id. at 160.
8. Letter From J. Edgar Hoover to the Harvard Law Review, Feb. 9, 1940, quoted
in Note, Wire Tapping and Law Enforcement, 53 HARv. L. RBv. 870 n.53 (1940).
9. Department of Justice Press Release, March 15, 1940, quoted at 9 INT'L JuluD.
Ass'N MoNrTLY BULL. 103 (1941).
10. H.R. 479, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
11. H.R. 12394, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
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duced a bill to permit wiretapping in all cases.12 His explanation for
this shift in position was that the telephone and telegraph now con-
stitute dangerous channels through which criminal conspiracy can
operate with impunity.
As Dash and his colleagues have demonstrated, the record in New
York bears out the conclusion that wiretapping is most useful as a
weapon against organized vice.'3 The overwhelming majority of
the wiretaps authorized in New York have been in gambling, nar-
cotics, and prostitution cases. There have been very few wiretapping
orders in prosecutions for the most serious crimes, such as rape,
robbery, and murder, because wiretapping is almost useless in such
cases. There have likewise been very few orders in security cases.
The evils inherent in wiretapping assume far greater proportions
when they are balanced, not against the evils of subversion, but
against the lesser evils of gambling.
There are even more serious objections to the second argument of
the Attorney General-that wiretapping is essentially no different
from many accepted law enforcement practices. A crucial difference
lies in the extent to which wiretapping invades the privacy of wholly
innocent people. None of the legislative proposals to authorize wire-
tapping would restrict tapping to the wires of people suspected of
crime. One of the most recent Supreme Court cases in this field in-
volved a tap on a public telephone in a bar. 4 Apparently it is stand-
ard practice for the New York police to tap public telephones which
may be used by suspects. These taps may record one conversation
involving a gambler or narcotics offender and five hundred conver-
sations involving wholly innocent and unsuspecting people whose
most personal affairs are thus laid bare to view.
Even when the police tap the wires of a criminal suspect, they
almost inevitably intercept the conversations of many people having
no connection with the suspected offense. This serious aspect of the
wiretapping problem was humorously illustrated by a cartoon in
the Wall Street Journal which showed two detectives giving their
superior a staggering stack of records with the explanation: "The
guy we wire tapped is the father of a teenage girl!"
Several years ago I tried a case where I was required to read the
transcription of hundreds of telephone conversations intercepted by
the New York police. For the first time, I really understood why Mr.
Justice Holmes once characterized wiretapping as "dirty business."
The participants in these conversations included an insurance com-
pany, several doctors, a lawyer, numerous department stores, a gro-
cery, a pharmacy, a dairy, and countless other people who were not
12. S. 1292, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
13. D s 40, 65-66.
14. See Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957).
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even suspected of any offense. The taps included many calls in
which the defendant was not a participant at all. They included,
moreover, conversations of the most confidential character- con-
versations between husband and wife, lawyer and client, physician
and patient. The most intimate details of these people's lives became
a matter of police record as the result of a single wiretap.
Furthermore, the fruits of police wiretapping all too often become
a matter of public record. Many of my client's conversations were
read at a public hearing in the New York courts. At least one of
them was reprinted in full by the New York Times. Others were
presented before a nationwide television audience during the Ke-
fauver Committee hearings. Unfortunately, this was not an isolated
occurrence. The McClellan Committee, for example, used national
television to make public countless conversations intercepted by the
New York police.
No search warrant could possibly involve so sweeping an intru-
sion into private affairs. As Professor Schwartz has pointed out:
A search warrant must specify the things for which the officer is to
search and, in general, these must be either articles used to commit the
crime or else the proceeds of crime. A search for an object of purely evi-
dentiary significance would almost certainly be held unconstitutional, as
in case the warrant purported to authorize the seizure of a personal diary
containing an account of the alleged crime. But wire tapping is unavoidably
a hunt for evidence, pure and simple, i.e., for incriminating admissions.
And since no one -can forecast when the incriminating admission will be
made, the hunt may have to go on for months, as against the specific and
limited temporal authority granted by the ordinary search warrant for tan-
gible things ... 15
Another difference between wiretapping and using an ordinary
search warrant is that the victim seldom learns that his wires have
been tapped. If government agents seize a man's papers or property
without a valid warrant, he can make a motion to the court for their
return. However, if government agents listen to a man's most con-
fidential conversations over weeks or months or even years, he may
never even discover it. Such abuses cannot be corrected either in a
court of law or in the court of public opinion. Only where something
incriminating turns up do the courts enter the picture. It is thus the
innocent who are left completely without remedy.
The federal government's attitude toward wiretapping has been
riddled with inconsistencies which have served only to augment the
problems inherent in this field. During World War I, Congress pro-
hibited wiretapping because of widespread fear that government
communications were being intercepted. But when this proscription
expired at the end of the war, wiretapping became one of the gov-
15. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 163.
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emiment's own chief weapons against Prohibition violators. Law en-
forcement tapping was discontinued under Attorney General Stone
in 1924 but resumed under Attorney General Mitchell in 1981. It
was again temporarily discontinued by Attorney General Jackson in
1940 but again resumed by direction of President Roosevelt a few
months later.'6 However, since 1940 the government has tapped
with appalling consistency whenever it has felt the need to do so.
In 1958, J. Edgar Hoover stated publicly that the FBI was operating
ninety wiretaps across the country, all in internal security cases.17
By its own admission, the FBI also employs wiretaps in kidnapping
cases.
In 1957 1 delivered a lecture in which I challenged the legality of
FBI wiretapping. Louis B. Nichols, assistant director of the FBI,
wrote me a letter after this lecture in which he summarized the
Bureau's present position as follows:
I am unaware of any court decision which has ruled that wire taps are
illegal per se. What the courts have done is to ban evidence secured from
wire taps and this whole matter was explored rather fully in the attached
statement of the late Mr. Justice Robert H. Jackson when he was Attorney
General. In the FBI, telephone taps are utilized only with the written ap-
proval of the Attorney General in cases involving internal security or those
involving kidnapping.I8
In his attached statement analyzing section 605 of the Communi-
cations Act of 1934,'" Attorney General Jackson stated:
There is no Federal statute that prohibits or punishes wire tapping alone.
The only offense under the present law is to "intercept any communication
and divulge or publish" the same. Any person, with no risk of penalty may
tap telephone wires and eavesdrop on his competitor, employer, work-
man or others and act upon what he hears or make any use of it that does
not involve divulging or publication.20
Section 605 provides that "no person not being authorized by the
sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish
the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of
such intercepted communication to any person. . ." However, it
further provides that "no person having received such intercepted
communication or having become acquainted with the contents, sub-
16. See Brownell, The Public Security and Wire Tapping, 39 Coimm L.Q. 195,
196-200 (1954); Rogers, supra note 3, at 794-95.
17. Wash. Post & Times Herald, May 19, 1958, § A, p. 10, col 2 (final ed.).
18. Letter From Louis B. Nichols to Edward Bennett Williams, Oct. 25, 1957.
19. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 605, 48 Stat. 1103, 47 U.S.C. § 605(1958).
20. Letter From Attorney General Robert H. Jackson to Hon. Hatton W. Sumners,
Committee on the Judiciary, March 19, 1941. The Jackson view remains the position
of the Attorney Generals office even now. See Transcript of Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
86th Cong., 1st Sess., at 160 (Dec. 15-16, 1959) (testimony of Attorney General
William P. Rogers).
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stance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof,
knowing that such information was so obtained, shall ...use the
same or any information therein contained for his own benefit or for
the benefit of another not entitled thereto .. . ." Formerly, any
violation of this statute was a federal felony."' Since 1954, one's first
violation constitutes a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for
one year and a fine of $10,000, and only subsequent violations are
punishable as felonies.2"
In short, not only is it a criminal offense to tap and divulge the
intercepted information, but also it is a criminal offense to tap and
make use of the information so derived. The Attorney General's con-
trary conclusion is clearly erroneous. Unfortunately, however, his
subsequent appointment to the Supreme Court has invested this
statement with an aura of infallibility which undoubtedly he would
have been the first to disclaim had the question arisen. In a leading
deportation case, for example, Mr. Justice Jackson concurred in a
decision squarely contrary to an opinion which he had given to the
Secretary of War when he was Attorney General.23 In explaining
this reversal of opinion, he wrote: "It would be charitable to assume
that neither the nominal addressee nor the nominal author of the
opinion read it. That, I do not doubt, explains Mr. Stimson's accept-
ance of an answer so inadequate to his questions. But no such con-
fession and avoidance can excuse the then Attorney General." 24 In
a more humorous vein, Mr. Justice Jackson went on to quote Lord
Westbury, who once rebuffed a barrister's reliance upon one of his
earlier opinions with the comment: "'I can only say that I am
amazed that a man of my intelligence should have been guilty of
giving such an opinion.' "25 1 feel sure that Mr. Justice Jackson
would have retracted his wiretapping opinion with similar grace
had the matter been presented to the Supreme Court.
Even if divulgence or publication were a condition precedent to
violation of section 605, FBI wiretapping would be illegal. We must
assume that FBI agents do not tap for their own amusement. They
tap to secure information which is reported to their superiors. When
the Department of Justice takes the position, as it has, that divul-
gence by one government agent to another is not divulgence at all,
it defies the plain words of the statute and the decisions of the Su-
preme Court. The statute provides that "no person" shall intercept
a telephone conversation and divulge its contents to "any person."
The Supreme Court has specifically ruled that a federal agent is a
21. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 501, 48 Stat. 1100.
22. 68 Stat. 30 (1954), 47 U.S.C. § 501 (1958).
23. See McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162, 176 (1950) (concurring opinion).
24. Id. at 177.
25. Id. at 178.
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"person" for the purposes of this statute.26 Any other conclusion
would be patently absurd.
Of course, wiretapping has not been done exclusively by the gov-
ernment, but by private tappers as well. However, despite wide-
spread private tapping without a shadow of legal justification, there
have been conspicuously few prosecutions for wiretapping. In fact,
prior to 1941 there was only one reported federal prosecution. This
record compels the conclusion that the Department of Justice is
somewhat dubious about its dual position as a tapper and a prosecu-
tor. In 1940, the Department of Justice ordered a federal district at-
torney to drop his investigation of wiretapping because federal agents
were engaged in tapping wires themselves.2 A 1950 grand jury in-
vestigation of wiretapping in the District of Columbia did not result
in a single indictment, and a congressional investigating committee
subsequently found that the government's unjustifiably narrow con-
struction of "divulgence" had made indictments fairly impossible.20
With few exceptions, the Department of Justice has been forced to
take the position that it could not tap with one hand and simultane-
ously prosecute private tappers with the other.
While public pressure has compelled several prosecutions of pri-
vate tappers during the past several years, there has never been a
federal 30 prosecution of a state officer. Local police have taken ex-
tensive advantage of this virtual immunity. For example, Dash's re-
cent study revealed widespread police wiretapping in all seven
states surveyed.31 Some states, notably New York, have gone so far
as to enact constitutional or statutory provisions specifically permit-
ting what the federal law prohibits.32 Under New York law, the state
courts may issue orders which purport to authorize wiretapping by
state officers. True, the import of the Supreme Court's holding in
Benanti v. United States33 is that every New York policeman who
26. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937). See also Application for
Order Permitting Interception of Tel. Communications, 28 U.S.L. W= 2446 (N.Y.
City Ct. Gen. Sess. March 7, 1960) (release of tapped information from police
officer to superior officer or assistant district attorney is "divulgence" within the
meaning of § 605).
27. See United States v. Gruber, 39 F. Supp. 291 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 123 F.2d 307(2d Cir. 1941).
28. See Hearings on S. Res. 224 Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Inter-
state Commerce, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940); Westin, The Wire Tapping Prob-
lem: An Analysis and a Legislative Proposal, 52 CoLum. L. 1Ev. 165, 169 (1952).
29. S. REP. No. 2700, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1950); see Westin, supra note 28,
at 169.
30. Apparently, however, public pressure has been successful in compelling a few
state prosecutions of law enforcement officers. See Silver, The Wiretapping-
Eavesdropping Problem: A Prosecutor's View, 44 Mn;N. L. REV. 835 (1960).
31. See generally DAsH 35-285.
32. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12; N.Y. CODE Cmm. Psoc. § 813-a.
33. 355 U.S. 96 (1957). See also Pugach v. Dollinger, 28 U.S.L. Wm= 2418 (2d
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taps a wire under one of these orders and subsequently divulges
what he has heard is guilty of a federal crime. Nevertheless, the
New York courts continue to issue orders, 4 the New York police
continue to tap wires, and the Department of Justice continues to
look the other way.
In view of the failure to enforce existing wiretapping prohibitions,
it is not surprising that there have been repeated proposals to amend
the Communications Act to legalize wiretapping. However, legal-
izing patent invasions of individual rights is hardly the way to eradi-
cate unfair and unjustifiable law enforcement techniques. The only
apparent solution to these problems is to bring wiretapping under
the fourth amendment. This was the course advocated thirty years
ago by the dissenters in Olmstead v. United States.5 It is the course
advocated currently by Mr. Justice Douglas s 6 and many other seri-
ous students of the law. The intervening years have yielded no ac-
ceptable alternative. This course would forever lay to rest the con-
tention that government wiretapping is lawful so long as there is
no divulgence outside the Department of Justice. It would likewise
bring an end to attempted legislative encroachment upon present
prohibitions. Congress can amend or repeal the Communications,
Act, but it cannot amend or repeal the fourth amendment.
II. TnF EAVESDROPPING PROBLEM
With modem electronic devices, conversations within the home and the
office can be recorded without tapping any wire. The intimacies of private
life can be made public without a key being turned or a window being
rasied. And those who listen in may be private detectives and black-
mailers, as well as law-enforcement officials.aT
The eavesdropping problem is far newer and far graver than the
wiretapping problem. It is particularly serious because it is shrouded
in a conspiracy of silence. Only occasionally is there an incident
which demonstrates the grim truth to the public-that no conver-
sation, however confidential, is really immune from the threat of
a hidden microphone.
Unfortunately, the law relating to eavesdropping is even more
chaotic and outdated than the law of wiretapping. Concededly the
Cir. Feb. 11, 1960) (federal court should stay use in New York court of wiretap
evidence obtained under New York law but in violation of § 605 of the Communica-
tions Act).
84. But see Application for Order Permitting Interception of Tel. Communications,
28 U.S.L. WEEK 2446 (N.Y. City Ct. Gen. Sess. March 7, 1960); Matter of Inter-
ception of TeL Communications, 9 Misc. 2d 121, 170 N.Y.S.2d 84 (Sup. Ct. 1958)
(advisory memorandum).
85. 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Holmes, Brandeis, Butler, and Stone, JJ., separately
dissenting).
36. See DocmmAs, op. cit. supra note 1, at 150-51.
37. Id. at 150.
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Communications Act is inapplicable unless telephone, telegraph, or
radiotelegraph conversations are involved.3s The applicability of the
fourth amendment has not been definitively settled. Federal prose-
cutors apparently proceed on the rather conceptual theory that any
form of electronic snooping is constitutional so long as it is not ac-
complished by means of a "trespass."39
The unhappy state of the law in this field was well demonstrated
by the case of Bernard Goldfine. Goldfine, a prominent New Eng-
land textile manufacturer, came to Washington to testify before a
congressional committee created to investigate allegedly improper
pressure upon the federal regulatory agencies. After he had testified
for several days, he discovered the committee's chief investigator in
a room adjoining his hotel suite. The investigator admitted that he
had secured this room for the express purpose of overhearing every-
thing said in the Goldfine suite. He admitted that he placed an
electronic listening device adjacent to the locked door which sepa-
rated his room from the Goldfine suit. And he admitted that he
overheard conversations even between Goldfine and his wife and
between Goldfine and his counsel.
Subsequently, Goldfine refused to answer certain questions pro-
pounded by the committee on the ground that they were not perti-
nent to its authorized scope of inquiry. I represented him in the en-
suing contempt case. When I filed motions to suppress any record-
ings made by the investigator and for other relief, the government's
'defense" was that the only conversations overheard by the investi-
gator related to personal and family matters, rather than to Gold-
fine's testimony before the committee. A second "defense" was that
the listening device never protruded under the door into Goldfine's
suite, and hence there was no trespass.
The trial judge felt constrained to uphold these "defenses" under
the authorities, but he said:
It is certainly understandable that the defendant should complain of
and be indignant at the intrusion upon his conversations with his counsel
in the manner revealed at the hearing, and it may well be that such should
be considered in mitigation of any punishment which would be visited upon
him if convicted of the charges in the indictment .... 4 0
Later the judge permitted Goldflne to enter a plea of nolo contend-
ere, despite the government's objection, and suspended his sentence.
The character of the government's "defenses" in this case demon-
38. See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 131 (1954). See also On Lee v. United
States, 343 U.S. 747, 751-53 (1952); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129,
134-35 (1942).
39. To support this position, federal prosecutors have relied on such cases as On
Lee v. United States, supra note 38, at 754; Goldman v. United States, supra note
38, at 133-34. See also Irvine v. California, supra note 38, at 132.
40. United States v. Goldfine, 174 F. Supp. 255, 259 (D.D.C. 1959).
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strates that the time has arrived for a change in the law. The prin-
ciples of law are radically distorted when eavesdropping becomes
defensible on the ground that everything overheard was purely per-
sonal and that in any event the eavesdropping device was located
outside the victim's room.
Most of the proposed changes, however, overlook both the basic
character of electronic eavesdropping and the basic meaning of the
fourth amendment. Wiretapping and eavesdropping are generally
treated as a single problem, admitting of a single solution. Those
who defend one defend both, and those who condemn one condemn
both. In New York, for example, court orders are issued for eaves-
dropping just as they are for wiretapping.41 There have been pro-
posals in Congress to adopt a similar statute applicable to the fed-
eral government.42
The flaw in these proposals is that eavesdropping invariably and
inevitably constitutes a hunt for evidence. Wiretapping, on the other
hand, has a dual aspect. It may constitute a hunt for evidence, but
it may also be employed in a situation where the telephone becomes
an instrumentality of crime. Fundamental fairness requires that the
police should not stand by helpless when criminals are using the
inventions of modern science to perpetrate their criminal designs.
However, this consideration is completely inapplicable to elec-
tronic eavesdropping. Its victims are not necessarily using any of the
inventions of modem science to perpetrate their criminal designs.
When law enforcement officers insist that they must overhear pri-
vate conversations in private homes and offices, they are not using a
new method of law enforcement against a new method of crime
commission. Instead, they are using a new kind of scientific achieve-
ment to inaugurate a new kind of totalitarianism.
In his famous Olmstead dissent, Mr. Justice Brandeis recognized
that the fourth amendment is primarily a protection of privacy. He
pointed out that when the Constitution was adopted force and vio-
lence were the only known methods of compelling incriminatory
testimony or the production of private papers. But he continued:
Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have become
available to the Government. Discovery and invention have made it possible
for the Government, by means far more effective than stretching upon the
rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is whispered in the closet ...
The progress of science in furnishing the Government with means of
espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping. Ways may some day be
developed by which the government, without removing papers from secret
drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to
expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home. . . . Can it
41. See note 32 supra.
42. See, e.g., S. 1292, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
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be that the Constitution affords no protection against such invasions of in-
dividual security? 43
As Mr. Richard Schwartz, who wrote the section of The Eaves-
droppers concerning eavesdropping techniques, so clearly demon-
strates, 44 Mr. Justice Brandeis' prophetic fears have now become a
reality. Today it is possible to expose to a jury the most intimate oc-
currences of the home. Recent advances in electronic eavesdropping
devices would be incredible if they were not so authoritatively docu-
mented. In a few minutes time, any telephone can be transformed
into a microphone which transmits every sound in the room even
when the receiver is on the hook. Tiny microphones can be secreted
behind a picture or in some other inconspicuous location. If wires
cannot be readily concealed, a strip of special paint will act as a
wire. Moreover, wireless microphones have reached a high degree
of sensitivity and strength.
Even more sinister are devices which can pick up every sound in
a room from without. Great success has been reported with contact
microphones. These devices can be placed on the outside of a pic-
ture window or against any surface which acts as a sounding board.
The District of Columbia police have reported that a contact micro-
phone placed against the heating duct of a row house from the ad-
joining premises can pick up every word spoken in the entire house.
There are also reliable reports concerning devices which can pick
up conversations hundreds of feet away. A parabolic microphone
can pick up conversations through an open window several hundred
feet away. The possibility of beaming ultrasonic or electromagnetic
waves into a room and thereby overhearing everything said in the
room is still at an experimental level, but acoustical experts tell us
that it appears possible. The techniques section of The Eavesdrop-
pers warns:
To be certain of defense against any eavesdropping of this kind (and
incidentally, against wireless microphones as well), one should shield his
room completely with a continuous covering of aluminum foil and sub-
stitute for his window glass a special conducting glass made by several of
the large glass companies.... 45
The Dash study reveals widespread use of concealed microphones
by state police and private detectives alike. This study did not in-
clude the activities of federal officers, but if concealed microphones
are used by the District of Columbia police, it is only fair to assume
that they are used by other officers enforcing federal law. Private
eavesdroppers are using concealed microphones in an endless va-
43. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473-74 (1928).
44. See, e.g., DAsH 803-58.
45. Id. at 358.
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riety of situations, from wives checking on their husbands' fidelity to
business firms checking on their employees' attitudes and efficiency.
Several widely publicized incidents have underscored the fright-
ening potentials of such practices. One such incident involved a con-
cealed microphone in the prison room assigned to a New York attor-
ney for conferences with his client.46 Public indignation ran espe-
cially high when it was discovered that this same room was used
for hearing the confessions of Catholic prisoners. Popular indigna-
tion also soared when it was discovered that the New York Transit
Authority was using hidden microphones to spy on the transit work-
ers' union during a recent strike.
Such practices must be distinguished from situations where a con-
versation is recorded or transmitted with the consent of one partici-
pant. Law enforcement officers, for example, may wear a concealed
recording device when interviewing suspects or witnesses. Informers
may agree to have a microphone concealed in their clothing when
they engage the suspect in an incriminating conversation, so that
police officers can overhear the conversation and testify about it in
court.
Such conduct may be unethical. Many people whose views I re-
spect also think that it is unconstitutional. Their reasoning, how-
ever, has never completely persuaded me on this point. Every time
we engage in a conversation we run the risk that the other party
may betray us. He may reveal what we have said to our personal
enemies, our business competitors, or the police. He may try to
blackmail us. Such risks are inherent in human relationships. They
are in essence no different from the risk that the person in whom
we confide has arranged to record or broadcast what we say by
means of some concealed device. The only real distinction is that a
simultaneous record or broadcast is more complete and exact than
any subsequent report. This is a distinction in degree but not in
essence.
Where a conversation is recorded or transmitted without the con-
sent of any participant, an entirely different set of concepts must
apply. This is the ultimate invasion of privacy-one which goes
well beyond the normal conversational risks one must assume. Phys-
ical searches and even wiretapping pale by comparison. It is absurd
to hold that the Constitution protects private papers but not private
conversations. It is equally absurd to suggest that the law should
protect telephone conversations alone.
46. See id. at 76-78.
47. See On Lee v. United States, 843 U.S. 747, 758-67 (1952) (Frankfurter,
Douglas & Burton, JJ., separately dissenting); United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d
306, 311-18 (2d Cir. 1951) (Frank, J., dissenting). Each of these dissenters relied
on the fourth amendment as a basis for unconstitutionality; Douglas also relied on
the fifth amendment.
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Eavesdropping, like wiretapping, must consequently be recog-
nized as a search and seizure. It must be brought under the fourth
amendment. In my view, this would end eavesdropping by federal
officers. No statute purporting to authorize the issuance of warrants
for eavesdropping would be constitutional, because the fourth
amendment prohibits any attempt to authorize a hunt for incrimi-
nating admissions.
As the late Judge Jerome Frank once wrote:
A dictaphone, by its very nature, conducts an exploratory search for
evidence of a house-owner's guilt. Such exploratory searches for evidence
are forbidden, with or without warrant, by the Fourth Amendment ....
A search warrant must describe the things to be seized, and those things
can be only (1) instrumentalities of the crime or (b) [sic] contraband.
Speech can be neither. A listening to all talk inside a house has only one
purpose- evidence-gathering. No valid warrant for such listening or for
the installation: of a dictaphone could be issued. Such conduct is lawless,
an unconstitutional violation of the owner's privacy.48
Independent of the fourth amendment, moreover, I think that
electronic eavesdropping ought to be outlawed. Its dangerous po-
tentialities far outweigh its values as --I aid to law enforcement.
Judge Frank went on to warn:
The practice of broadcasting private inside-the-house conversations
through concealed radios is singularly terrifying when one considers how
this snide device has already been used in totalitarian lands. Under Hitler,
when it became known that the secret police planted dictaphones in houses,
members of families often gathered in bathrooms to conduct whispered dis-
cussions of intimate affairs, hoping thus to escape the reach of the sending
apparatus. Orwell, depicting the horrors of a future completely regimented
society, could think of no more frightening instrument there to be employed
than the "telescreen" compulsorily installed in every house. .... 49
If we are to authorize electronic eavesdropping at all, we should
certainly confine it to the most serious cases. By common consensus,
these are the cases involving national security. But, as Judge Frank
pointed out, we defeat our own democratic purposes if we adopt the
techniques of totalitarianism in security cases. We do to ourselves
from within what we fear most from without.
Private use of electronic eavesdropping devices poses a somewhat
different problem from private wiretapping. In the first place, Con-
gress cannot constitutionally regulate private eavesdropping except
within narrowly circumscribed limits. It could, for example, outlaw
private eavesdropping in connection with labor disputes in indus-
tries affecting interstate commerce, but it could not outlaw all pri-
vate eavesdropping. A fortiori it could not outlaw electronic eaves-
dropping by state officers. And unless and until the Supreme Court
48. Id. at 313-14 n.17.
49. Id. at 317.
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overrules the doctrine of Wolf v. Colorado 50 the states remain free
to convict on the basis of evidence secured through eavesdropping
devices."
Moreover, if we concede the legality of electronic eavesdropping
done with the consent of one of the conversants, it becomes difficult
for the states to enforce statutes against electronic eavesdropping
where such consent is lacking. So long as the equipment is available
for legitimate purposes, it will be difficult to curb its use for illegiti-
mate purposes. Nevertheless, the legal distinction between eaves-
dropping with the consent of one party and without the consent of
either, which has been adopted in New York by statute,5 is correct
in principle and deserving of careful consideration by other state
legislatures.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
It would be naive to suppose that the fourth amendment offers an
immediate and automatic solution to the problems of wiretapping
and eavesdropping. In the first place, the fourth amendment is
equally applicable to all offenses. The telephone is often used in the
commission of relatively minor offenses, such as gambling and pros-
titution. Even though the fourth amendment would permit wire-
tapping in such cases, we must consider whether Congress should
exercise the full sweep of its constitutional power.
At present, I would advocate legislation restricting the issuance of
wiretapping warrants to cases involving national security. Insofar as
kidnapping and extortion are concerned, law enforcement officers
can secure the consent of the victim or his family to install a wire-
tap. Under the present statute such consent makes the interception
lawful,53 and the same reasoning should be applicable under the
fourth amendment. There has been no showing of necessity in other
types of criminal cases sufficient to justify the invasion of individual
privacy that wiretapping inevitably entails.
A second problem centers around the authority to issue wiretap-
ping warrants. The Department of Justice has advocated conferring
this power upon the Attorney General. 4 I think, however, that this
power should be vested in the judiciary, because the judiciary is the
traditional bulwark between citizen and prosecutor. Law enforce-
ment officers, like defense attorneys, are sometimes carried away by
the merits of their own causes. It is unfair to ask the Department of
50. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
51. See Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952); of. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25 (1949). But see Pugach v. Dollinger, 28 U.S.L. Wmx 2418 (2d. Cir. Feb. 11,
1960) (decided after the completion of this Article).
52. N.Y. PEN. LAw §§ 738-45.
53. See Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957).
54. See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 3, at 798.
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Justice to pass upon the propriety of its own requests for wiretap-
ping authorization.
It has been objected that the secrecy essential to successful wire-
tapping could not be maintained if every federal judge in the coun-
try were empowered to issue wiretapping warrants. It has also been
objected that prosecutors would indulge in "judge shopping" and
that all applications for warrants would be made before judges will-
ing to grant them without question. I believe that these objections
constitute an unwarranted reflection upon the federal judiciary. In
order to obviate any possible problem in this area, however, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court should appoint one judge in
each district who would be exclusively empowered to issue wiretap-
ping warrants for a designated period.
Other necessary safeguards include the following: all applications
for wiretapping warrants should be approved by the Attorney Gen-
eral; no warrant should be issued for a period longer than twenty
days; and at the end of every year, the Department of Justice should
report the number of taps installed and the number which resulted
in criminal prosecutions, so that the public will be informed as to
the extent and fruitfulness of this practice.55
Admittedly it may be difficult in a given case for the judge to
determine whether a telephone is being used in furtherance of a
criminal enterprise or whether it is merely a source of evidence
about a criminal enterprise. A rough rule of thumb would be to per-
mit wiretapping before the crime has been committed but not after
it is completed. Situations can easily be envisioned, however, where
this rule would operate unfairly. Allegations of a continuing conspir-
acy, for example, might be used to frustrate the constitutional pro-
hibition of evidence-gathering.
The use of wiretapping in conspiracy cases raises the question of
standing to challenge the legality of a tap upon some else's wire. By
analogy to search and seizure precedents and also to extant wire-
tapping precedents, only the individual whose conversation was in-
tercepted should have standing to object to the interception. Robert
Knowlton, author of the section of The Eavesdroppers analyzing the
pertinent law, has suggested,56 however, that the Supreme Court
abandoned this technical rule in the Benanti case.57
The problem of allocating the burden of proof in this field would
be just as serious under the fourth amendment as it is under the
current statute. At present the authorities are settled that the de-
fendant has the burden of proving that his wires were tapped, but
it is not entirely clear whether he also has the burden of proving
55. See generally Malin, Is Wire Tapping Justified?, 300 Annals 29 (July, 1955).
56. See DAsia 897-98.
57. 355 U.S. 96 (1957).
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some use of the intercepted conversations by the prosecution.58 Use
is often very difficult to prove, because either several federal agen-
cies, or both federal and state agencies, may be involved in the
preparation of a single case. For example, a federal district attorney
prosecuting a case may be completely unaware that state wiretap-
ping revealed the identity of a key witness. No rule of law can obvi-
ate this kind of difficulty.
Other complex problems center around the area of federal-state
relationships. Would the fourth amendment permit the federal
courts to admit evidence secured through state wiretapping? Under
what circumstances should state wiretapping be permitted? What
sanctions should Congress impose to deter illegal state wiretapping?
The answers to these questions under present law would obviously
not be controlling under the fourth amendment."0
Without minimizing any of the foregoing problems, they are far
outweighed by the constructive results of imposing the require-
ments of the fourth amendment in this field. Experience has demon-
strated the difficulty of obtaining adequate legislation. If there is to
be reform, it must begin with the courts. Such reform would actually
strengthen the government in its fight against subversion, because
the intercepted conversations of spies and saboteurs could then be
used in court against them. It would not weaken the government's
fight against other crimes, because we have been assured that FBI
wiretapping is confined to security and kidnapping cases.
By recognizing that we are dealing with searches and seizures in
the constitutional sense, we would compel ourselves to strike a bal-
ance between the rights of the individual and the rights of society.
Under established principles, a search for purely evidentiary ma-
terial is unlawful.6" Current proposals to authorize wiretapping and
eavesdropping completely ignore these principles. One bill, for ex-
ample, would authorize the courts to issue warrants for wiretapping
and eavesdropping if there is reasonable ground to believe that evi-
dence of a federal crime may be thus obtained.6' The courts cannot
issue warrants for the seizure of tangible objects merely because
they constitute evidence of a federal crime, and this same limitation
must be applied to warrants for the "seizure" of conversations.
58. See, e.g., Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 838, 341 (1939); United States
v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 636 (2d Cir. 1950); United States v. Goldstein, 120 F.2d
485, 488 (2d Cir. 1941), aff'd on other grounds, 316 U.S. 114 (1942).
59. Cf. Hanna v. United States, 260 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Rios v. United
States, 256 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. granted, 359 U.S. 965 (1959) (No. 854,
1958 Term; renumbered No. 52, 1959 Term).
60. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 154 (1947); United States v.
Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 465-66 (1932); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309
(1921). A recent United States Supreme Court decision apparently reaffirming this
view is Abel v. United States, 80 Sup. Ct. 683 (1960) (dictum).
61. S. 1292, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
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Otherwise the protection of the fifth amendment becomes an anti-
quated relic. Of what avail is a defendant's privilege not to testify
against himself if his most confidential conversations can be secretly
recorded and reproduced before judge and jury?
If the fourth amendment is applied in this field, we will still be
free to prevent the use of telephones and telegraphs as instruments
of crime. This will end an admittedly inequitable existing situation
in which criminals can take advantage of modem technological ad-
vances theoretically unavailable to the police. But the police will be
precluded from using either wiretapping or electronic eavesdrop-
ping for evidence-gathering.
Most important of all, we can end wiretapping by private individ-
uals and regulate tapping by state officers. If the FBI is allowed to
tap when, and only when, the requirements of the fourth amend-
ment are satisfied, the Department of Justice can prosecute wiretap-
ping by others without appearing two-faced. For the first time,
Congress will be able to pass a really effective wiretapping law,
making it a crime to intercept conversations regardless of subsequent
divulgence or use. Once we have ended the sorry spectacle of federal
officers tapping in daily defiance of federal law, we can enforce our
wiretapping laws just as stringently as we enforce other criminal
statutes.
The dangerous consequences of continuing to countenance law-
less law enforcement were recognized by Mr. Justice Brandeis in the
Olmstead case. Mr. Justice Brandeis said:
Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a law-breaker, it breeds
contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it in-
vites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law
the end justifies the means -to declare that the Government may commit
crimes in order to secure the conviction of a rivate criminal - would bring
terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should reso-
lutely set its face.0 2
Extension of the fourth amendment ban offers the only alternative
to the pernicious doctrine so forcefully condemned by Mr. Justice
Brandeis. When we bring wiretapping under the Constitution and
wiretappers under the law, we will be taking a long step toward
restoration of popular respect for both the Constitution and the law.
62. 277 U.S. at 485 (dissenting opinion).
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